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D. P. Wilson


EXCOM 82-7032
5 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members

FROM : Executive Assistant to the DDCI

SUBJECT : Agenda for 12 August 1982 Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning--Covert Action and Counterintelligence Capabilities

The Executive Committee will meet at 1600 on Thursday, 12 August, in the DCI Conference Room to continue Phase III of this year's long-range planning process. You will be asked for your comments and/or approval of the attached papers on Counterintelligence (Tab 1) and Covert Action (Tab 2) capabilities.




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Attachments:
As Stated

cc: Director of Personnel
Comptroller
Acting Inspector General

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- 1 - ER via ES w/att
- 1 - EXCOM Chrono w/o att
- 1 - EXCOM Agenda w/o att
- 1 - EA/DDCI w/att

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
EXCOM Agenda Items

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Deputy Director for Policy, Analysis
and Evaluation

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. EA/OP
5E58 Hqs

10 AUG 1982

RB

Jim:

2.

3. DD/OP 10 AUG 1982
5E58 Hqs

4.

5. D/OP
5E58 Hqs

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The CI paper will be a useful tool for our phase of the long-range planning exercise. It gives the increased personnel needs (pg. 5 for FY 83 & pg. 10 for the out-years). In addition, it delineates the types of people needed with enough specificity for our planning use. The paper offers no program surprises but does outline the steps needed immediately, mid-term and long-term for both active and passive CI. It appears to me to be a very useful focus document.

The CA paper, to me, is not as useful for OP long-range planning purposes. Under judgments, it states that "existing human resources are inadequate to undertake new CA initiatives." It does not go on and identify the numbers and types of human resources needed. It does a good job of identifying and assessing program needs in each area of the world. The TABS identify initiatives, activities to be developed, proposals and technological developments required. One additional step is still needed and that is to identify the people needs to accomplish the initiatives and proposals.



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4 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
VIA: Deputy Director for Operations
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Chairman, Long Range Planning
Team for Counterintelligence
SUBJECT: Long Range Planning Program

Attached is the revised Phase II and III submission
on Counterintelligence for the 1982 Long Range Planning
Cycle.

Attachment: a/s

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WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper has been prepared by the Interdirectorate Planning Team for Counterintelligence in response to guidance provided by the Executive Director for Phase II and III of the CIA long-range planning for FY 1985 through 1990. It addresses the long-term threat represented by foreign intelligence and security services, reviews the FY 1983 CI Category Base Capability Statement, and lists the enhanced capabilities needed to meet the long-term threat. We have assumed a favorable policy climate for the practice of counterintelligence (CI), the availability of resources (money and manpower) at the current or an increased level and the absence of a major conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The paper accepts the definition and scope of counterintelligence as expressed in the Preface to the July 1982 NSSD 2-82 paper, "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983-88." In other words, we have excluded from our consideration international terrorism (even though Executive Order 12333 includes counter-terrorism in its definition of counterintelligence) and we have included protective security, even though security is excluded from counterintelligence by E.O. 12333. We also take into consideration countermeasures necessary to deal with broad technical threats such as imagery and SIGINT collection. Finally, although the time frame of the NSSD-2 Study (1983-88) varies slightly from the time frame of this paper (1985-90), both the nature and extent of the threat, and the enhanced capabilities needed to meet that threat, are expected to remain essentially the same for the additional two years covered by this paper.

II SUMMARY

The United States, during the planning period FY 1985 through 1990, faces a serious and growing human and technical threat from foreign intelligence and security services intent on acquiring a broad range of U.S. information and technology. The Soviet Union represents the principal threat with a lower but still significant threat from the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, the PRC and other communist countries. CIA's counterintelligence and countermeasures programs are presently inadequate to cope

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with this threat; immediate management decisions are needed to reallocate certain resources; [REDACTED] million dollars will be required to correct manpower and other resource deficiencies, with the bulk of the resources going to the Directorate of Administration (DA) for strengthening security related countermeasures and to the Directorate of Operations (DO) for rebuilding its overseas counterintelligence program. The Directorates of Intelligence (DI) and Science and Technology (DS&T) require lesser but significant resource enhancement to develop counterintelligence and protective security programs to support the Agency-wide effort. Specific enhancements of CIA counterintelligence and countermeasure capabilities, grouped in Section V of this paper by relative urgency and by type of commitment (i.e. management or resource) needed, will include:

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--An increase in the number of CIA officers overseas who are actively involved in the effort to acquire additional penetrations of the KGB and GRU, and of the Communist Bloc, PRC and Cuban services.

--The assignment of CI operations officers to selected stations overseas and to management level positions in DO area divisions.

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[REDACTED]

--Expansion of the counterintelligence analytical capability within the DO (Counterintelligence Staff), DI, and DA (Office of Security) to include damage assessment, counter-deception analysis, and counterintelligence concerns applicable to staff and staff-like personnel.

--Additional resources devoted to the counterintelligence aspects of the technology transfer problem with emphasis on developing CI related countermeasures.


--Expansion of counterintelligence training.

--Increase in number of security investigators and polygraph examiners to correct clearance time lapse and delayed reinvestigations.

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--Development of improved computer security systems including R&D.

--Expanded linguistic capability.

--Expansion of counterintelligence relationships with cooperating foreign intelligence and security services.

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
--Development of computer programs specifically designed to support counterintelligence and protective security.

--Strengthening of document security programs with special emphasis on SCI material.

--Acquisition of additional security equipment including: safes, emergency destruction devices, surreptitious entry detection devices, closed circuit TV, and the expansion of the number of security officers overseas.

--Strengthening of industrial security programs.

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III THREAT ASSESSMENT

The hostile activities of foreign intelligence and security services of the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, the PRC, and other communist countries represent, and will continue to represent, the most serious threat to the security of the United States and its allies. Services of the "third world" and even those of countries historically friendly to the United States will represent an increasing threat. While there will be no dramatic change in the numbers and types of operations directed against U.S. interests, the threat will be increased by the continued rapid development of technology used in support of agent operations. Also, the extent of the drain of U.S. and Western technology through espionage and other means, both legal and illegal, is only now beginning to be understood, and, if left unchecked, will become increasingly serious.

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A more detailed threat assessment is attached as an appendix.

IV REVIEW OF CI BASE CAPABILITY STATEMENT

FY 83 Allocation of CIA Resources Devoted to CI

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CIA's counterintelligence mission is to detect and frustrate the overseas activities of foreign intelligence and security services that are inimical to the United States and foreign governments allied or cooperating with it. The DO plays the leading role in the CI effort, utilizing the resources of other CIA directorates and the Intelligence Community as required. The DA, especially the Office of Security (OS) and Office of Communications (OC), is responsible for protective security support of the overall counterintelligence mission. The DS&T, primarily its Office of SIGINT Operations (OSO), and the DI play minor but important roles. The DO's mission includes penetration of foreign intelligence and security services through the recruitment of in-place sources, research and investigation of counterintelligence leads, exploitation of defectors, conduct or coordination of double agent operations, followup of hostile contacts with Americans overseas, the operational security of its own operations, coordination of the overseas CI activities of other members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, liaison with foreign intelligence and security services, the production of CI studies and disseminations, and the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence Community of a central index of foreign counterintelligence information.

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The Intelligence Division of the FBI is the DO's domestic counterpart, having for the most part the same functions and responsibilities within the United States as the DO does abroad. Coordination between the two agencies within the framework of E.O. 12333 works well, and cooperation on specific operational activities and investigations is excellent. Although the FBI contributes to the central counterintelligence index maintained by the DO, the FBI maintains its own index and data base in support of its counterintelligence efforts in the United States. While these data bases overlap somewhat, they are not identical and are controlled separately. Information is obtained by each service from the other's holdings through established and effective procedures which permit access while protecting sensitive source material. The CIA Office of Security also has effective liaison with the FBI Intelligence Division on security matters, particularly those concerned with penetration of the Agency through its employees or security approved/cleared associates.

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Both the CIA and FBI have growing programs designed to develop information on, negate, disrupt, and/or neutralize Soviet and other hostile efforts to acquire U.S. technology. There have been significant successes of late in this field which have added considerably to U.S. knowledge of the extent, direction, and degree of success of the Soviet effort. CIA works closely with investigative and law-enforcement agencies of the U.S. Government to ensure that the exchange of information with and between such agencies is an ongoing effort designed to achieve maximum results in negating hostile objectives. The level of effort that can be devoted to the problem, however, is inadequate. There are important questions of policy, organization, and definition of objectives to be resolved before the United States capability to counter technology loss will be improved. The problem is so extensive, moreover, that substantial collection, analytical, and enforcement resources will have to be devoted to it.

Much of the effort of the DI is devoted to analysis of Soviet technical intelligence collection systems and analyzing technology transfer issues. Some portions are assigned to the DCI's Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee, working on providing intelligence opinions to State concerning communist visitors to the U.S. The remainder is spread throughout the directorate, working on such things as imagery analysis topics, and on maintaining a number of data bases on foreign intelligence matters. Most of the external analysis funds available to the DI are used in support of efforts to analyze Soviet technical intelligence collection systems. A small effort involves analysis of Soviet camouflage, concealment and deception (CC&D) practices.

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V ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES

Just as the 1983 program was described as "a continuation of well established activities", the program for 1985-90 will not see a major deviation in types of activities. However, important management decisions will be required to implement changes in emphasis and to order immediate reallocation of available resources; and there are major resource enhancements, in terms of manpower and funds, which will be required in order to implement programs over the longer range. Within the DO, it will be important to ensure, through clear managerial commitment, through training, and through career enhancement, a greater appreciation for counterintelligence concerns and a concomitant increasing commitment to counterintelligence operations. In all of the directorates, enhanced recruitment and training will be necessary in order to attain the overall resource level required. R&D and state-of-the-art technology will be needed for adequate countermeasures against hostile technical collection, as well as for additional security measures. There is also a need for a significant change and increase in analytical capabilities, requiring additional positions and funds.

In listing below the enhanced capabilities which are required, we have attempted to group them in terms of relative importance. This has been done from two points of view: the urgency of the need, and the nature of the capability. In other words, there are some capabilities which can be implemented more quickly than others, and some which by their nature will take longer to put into action. Frequently the latter are also more costly in terms of manpower and funds. In general, the measures which should be implemented immediately are those which will require, particularly in the DO, management decisions to reallocate positions and activities. For example, assigning more operations officers to counterintelligence duties can only be done by taking them from other duties, and by filling the gaps created through immediate increases in recruiting and training. However, the cycle of recruitment, training, and acquisition of experience requires longer than the 1985-90 period to produce a functioning CI operations officer. Immediate requirements in the analytical field, needed in both the DI and DO, are subject to similar conditions: immediate reallocation of current resources supplemented by recruitment and training over the longer run. Immediate requirements of the DA and DS&T have a higher initial need for R&D, funding for new equipment, along with a hiring


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program which can be implemented in the short range, for security investigators, polygraph operators, etc. The most urgent need, and the one most easily solved, is the improvement of personnel security by hiring sufficient personnel.

There has been no attempt to provide cost figures for each enhanced capability. However, each directorate has submitted its total resource requirements for the 1985-90 period. These figures follow:

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
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THREAT ASSESSMENT APPENDIX

At the present time and for the long-range planning period (FY 1985-90), the hostile activities of foreign intelligence and security services--especially those of Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China and other communist countries--represent a serious threat to the security of the United States and its allies. Services of the so-called "third world" and, in a few instances, those of countries historically friendly to the U.S. will represent an increasing threat as they acquire expertise and technology either through their own efforts or with the assistance and cooperation of other countries--usually, but not necessarily, communist. We do not foresee a dramatic increase in the traditional human-related intelligence collection activities directed against us except in the area of high technology.

A. Current and Projected Threat



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
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COVERT ACTION:
LONG RANGE PLANNING
1982 - 1992

WARNING NOTICE:
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Phase II CA effort set forth the view of world conditions and pressures on the United States which might give rise to both needs and opportunities for actions in support of overall U.S. objectives. In addition, the Executive Committee review defined a group of core issues around which to focus proposed CA capabilities. In this paper, we discuss the core issues and area targets from the viewpoint of what operational needs/problems they create, what new concepts may be useful in planning long range CA activities, and planned initiatives. Technological means and other ideas are included which, if developed, would enhance CA propaganda efforts in reaching certain targets.

The paper begins with a summary of "Key Judgments" that were considered in planning future CA activities. There are four informational tabs. Tab A is a compendium of planned CA initiatives. Tab B is made up of additional CA activities against USSR/Eastern Europe targets that should be considered. Tab C comprises a list of a miscellany of CA proposals to exploit Soviet economic vulnerabilities. Tab D identifies technologies that need to be either refined or exploited. Tab E lists the DCI's approved CA Development Program.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

The area target problems and core issues defined during the Phase II review point to some specific future operational problems:

- Need for an enhanced positive intelligence base;
- need to develop interdirectorate and intradirectoriate task forces for non-country specific issues;
- for most of the area targets, we will have identified by 1986 an infrastructure to conduct on-demand a variety of CA activities.

Ongoing Initiatives: The DCI's CA Development Program has done much to prepare CIA to carry out actions in support of U.S. policy. However, the infrastructure rebuilding program will need to develop capabilities tailored to the particular needs of each geographic region.

New Technology: CA remains a human intensive business, yet present media technology can be employed to increase access to certain targets. Traditional CA methods will continue to be used throughout the next decade with emphasis on new techniques. CA programs will be enhanced by employing current technology and by acquiring certain electronic gear. However, agents of influence and media placement assets will continue to be the essential ingredient for political action.

Programs for the 80's: CA programs begun in the 80's will continue into the 90's with emphasis upon: countering Soviet and their surrogates' efforts to destabilizing governments friendly to the U.S., countering terrorism, obstructing international narcotics production and trafficking, countering nuclear proliferation; and selectively influencing international economics decisions of vital concern to the U.S.

Manpower: Existing human resources are inadequate to undertake new CA initiatives.

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